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Assessing the role of migration as trade-facilitator
using the statistical mechanics of cooperative
systems
Adriano Barra1, Andrea Galluzzi2, Daniele Tantari3, Elena Agliari2 and Francisco Requena-Silvente4
ABSTRACT Interactions between natives and foreign-born individuals may help to stimu-
late the development and the diversification of bilateral trade relationships. In fact, migrants
act as trade facilitators reducing transaction costs in export activities and, consequently,
more local firms are able to establish new trade relationships abroad. The pro-trade effect of
migration is well evidenced in several works where the shape of the trade-migration rela-
tionship has been examined empirically; however, they all lack an analytical model that
enables them to predict the expected non-linear relationship between migration and trade.
Here, using statistical mechanics tools we develop a simple model that demonstrates
that there is a positive non-linear relationship between the extensive margin of trade and the
proportion of migrants in the total population. Data on Spanish trade and migration provide
support for the predictions made by the theoretical model. The model also suggests the need
of a critical mass of migrants before their interactions with the natives have any effective
impact on trade. The threshold is sensitive to the nationality of the migrants, suggesting that
cultural differences between natives and migrants may affect the number of migrants needed
to generate a positive impact on trade. Furthermore, we examine the possible relationship
between the share of migrants in the total population and the extent of diversification of the
portfolio of exported goods, finding evidence of a strong positive correlation. Our approach
can be used to examine other related issues such as the impact of formal or informal firm
networks on trade.
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Introduction
S ince Gould’s (1994) pioneering paper, there has beensignificant growth in the number of studies examining theeconomics of the migration-trade nexus (see, for example,
Head and Rises, 1998; Partridge and Furtan, 2008; Hunt and
Gauthier-Loiselle, 2009; Ozgen et al., 2011; Egger et al., 2012;
Rashidi and Pyka, 2013). Most of this research has provided
evidence in favour of the pro-trade effect of migration (see Genc
et al., 2012 for a meta-analysis). The basic ideas underlying the
literature is that operating in international markets is difficult due
in part to large transaction costs and that migrants may help to
reduce these costs. Local firms may have access to crucial
knowledge about business opportunities, demand characteristics
and institutional features that exist abroad as a result of
interacting with foreign-born people.
Only a few papers have examined empirically the shape of the
trade-migration relationship. Using time-series data for the
United States, Gould (1994) found that the pro-trade effect of
migration disappeared when the number of migrants reached
certain level. Egger et al. (2012) confirmed for a sample of OECD
countries in 2005 that there is a saturation point in the trade-
migration relationship. Using regional data for Spain and Italy in
2007, Serrano-Domingo and Requena-Silvente (2013) found that
the migration-trade link is U-inverted, that is, when the number
of migrants is too small or too large the pro-trade effect is small.
The three papers derive the conclusions after searching for non-
linearities in the data. However, they all lack an analytical model
that enables them to predict the expected non-linear relationship
between migration and trade.
Here, we use tools from statistical mechanics to examine the
trade-migration link. Starting from a bipartite network formed by
two types of population living in the same space (natives and
migrants), we examine how the interactions between natives and
migrants affect the decisions of natives about trading abroad,
and we get a simple theoretical expression that explains how the
decision to trade (export) abroad by the natives in a certain
territory depends on the share of migrants living there.
Three interesting features emerge from our model. First, the
relevant measure of trade to evaluate the migration-trade link is
the extensive margin of trade; that is, the number of exporting
firms and the number of exported products. While most
empirical papers have examined the value of bilateral trade, only
a few papers (Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010; Bastos and Silva,
2012; Bahar and Rapoport, 2014) provide empirical evidence in
favour of migrants stimulating trade through more firms trading,
more transactions or more exported products.
Second, there is a minimum threshold in the mass of migrants
living in a certain territory before any positive pro-trade effect
emerges. Previous studies, discussed above, found some evidence
of an optimal (maximum) number of migrants but not of a
minimum. The existence of a minimum threshold makes sense in
our model because the number of interactions between natives
and migrants determines the likelihood that migrants may
influence in natives’ decisions about trading abroad. Third, once
the share of migrants reaches a certain level, the migration-trade
link has a non-linear relationship; more specifically, it is a square
root. As a result, the number of trade relationships abroad grows
fast as the share of migrants on the total population exceeds the
minimum threshold, while for relatively large values of the share
of immigrants it grows slower, eventually reaching a saturation
value. This phenomenon ultimately stems from the underlying
collective interactions between natives and immigrants. In
physics, it is typically evidence of a phase transition, namely, a
relatively sharp change in a system’s behaviour occurring from a
slight perturbation of the system parameters. In this case, the
system is the ensemble of all natives involved in trade in a given
territory, whose average behaviour is described by our measures
of the extensive margin of trade (number of exporting firms or
number of exported products), and the perturbation is encoded
by a variation in the share of migrants in the total population.
Next, we use newly available data for Spain over the period
2000–2012 on the extensive margin of trade (the number of
exporting firms and the diversification of export product
portfolio) in order to test the predictions of the model. Spain
has been the subject of previous studies examining the migration-
trade link because of its peculiarities compared with other OECD
countries (see, for example, Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010;
Artal-Tur et al., 2012; Serrano-Domingo and Requena-Silvente,
2013). In fact, Spain had one of the lowest immigration rates
among OECD countries before 2000 and received massive inflows
of migrants in a relatively short period of time (2000–2008). This
constitutes an ideal context to investigate the role of immigrants
in creating new trade relationships abroad.
Spanish data validates the theoretical model. It is shown that
the number of bilateral trade relationships abroad (proxied by the
number of firms exporting) is a square root of the percentage of
migrants in the host territory beyond a critical value, which
captures the minimum share of migrants needed to generate
enough interactions between natives and migrants in a defined
territory. Such a minimum threshold is found to be positive,
though very small. Moreover, it varies with the migrants’
countries of origin, suggesting that the pro-trade effect of
migration is affected by cultural differences.
We further deepen the analysis by relating the presence of
immigrants with the product diversification of the hosting
country. Using a Herfindahl index (H-index) to quantify the
inverse of product diversification of exports, we find a strong
negative connection between the share of immigrants and the
degree of export product concentration. We interpret that result
as evidence of migrants helping to increase the portfolio of
exported products in the host country.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: first
we illustrate the use of tools from statistical-mechanics to
investigate the migration-trade link. Next, we present the results
concerning the (non-linear) relationship between the share of
migrants and the number of exporting firms, as well as between
the share of migrants and the extent of product diversification in
exports. In the Supplementary Information we explain in further
detail the steps used to solve the model and we investigate the
topological properties of the network built between natives and
migrants.
Methodology
While the overarching theme of this article is in the field of social
sciences, the analytical tools employed come from statistical
mechanics. The latter aims to bridge two different descriptions of
the same perceivable reality that usually lie at two different scales.
For example, its original implementation in physics was designed
to obtain a unified and consistent picture of a microscopic world
(made up of molecules and atoms obeying the time-reversible
Newton mechanics) with a macroscopic world (obeying the
phenomenological rules of thermodynamics, where time reversi-
bility is lost and whose evolution is described in terms of mean
values and fluctuations). Nowadays, statistical mechanics has
been used successfully in several fields of research, ranging from
chemistry (Agliari et al., 2015) and biology (Buchanan, 2010)
to sociology (Durlauf, 1999), finance (Bouchaud and Potters,
2009) and economics (Tacchella, 2002). Here, the microscopic
world is the network of connections between natives and
migrants and the macroscopic world is the development
and diversification of exports in the territory where natives
and migrants live.
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Our starting point is a bipartite network where each link
connects two types of agents: natives and immigrants. The link
permits the transmission of information between the agents and
accounts for any kind of relationships between natives and
migrants (from family or friend links, to strictly professional
ones). For simplicity, the links are randomly allocated across pairs
of agents. This is a valid assumption because on a large scale (that
is, when accounting for relatively wide territorial districts) and
with a long time window (that is, with a time record over more
than 10 years) possible correlations get smoothed out. In our
model, a native is a decision maker who decides whether to trade
or not with a foreign country. The decision (captured by σ in our
model) can be either positive or negative. The likelihood of a
native trading with a foreign country depends on the amount of
information that other neighbouring natives and migrants have
about the foreign country. In particular, in this work we focus on
the information conveyed by the latter (represented by z in our
model). Our model ignores other information channels such as
own marketing research or news from the media.
In physics, our model is said to be cooperative (or imitative)
because the variables σ and z associated with the connected nodes
tend to be aligned (namely either both positive or both negative).
Clearly, in principle, one cannot exclude the existence of anti-
cooperative (or anti-imitative) connections among some pairs of
agents but, as long as the prevailing kind of interaction is
imitative, the qualitative results of the model are robust.
Finally, a degree of randomness (captured by β in the model)
is introduced. The underlying idea is that decision makers do
not cooperate in a completely rational way: even if the overall
information passed to a native is positive, there is still a
possibility that σ is negative. When β tends to zero, decision
makers behave randomly; that is, their propensity to trade σ is
positive with probability 1/2 and negative with probability 1/2,
regardless of the neighbourhood conditions. Conversely, when β
becomes very large, decision makers cooperate deterministi-
cally, that is, σ is just the sign of the overall information
gathered by the native.
Before solving the model, we show that it is possible to move
from the original bipartite network to a monopartite network
made by natives only and where the reciprocal interactions take
into account the information collected by natives in their
interplay with migrants. The idea is that some natives may learn
from migrants and they inform other natives.
The last step is to solve the model using the statistical
mechanics machinery. The system’s solution allows a theoretical
estimate to be obtained for the average number of decision
makers who intend to trade with foreign countries, based on the
strength of the interactions between natives and immigrants. In
the empirical section, this estimated number is compared with the
observed number of bilateral trade relationships that Spain
establishes abroad. This comparison connects a microscopic
observable with a macroscopic observable. In statistical
mechanics such a change of scale is a common route but some
checks must be carried out before. In particular, we need to prove
that there exists a linear proportionality between the total
population and the total number of firms. All the technical
details about this passage (along with a check of the underlying
assumptions) can be found in the Appendix A of Supplementary
Information.
The system’s solution provides a very simple relationship
between the extensive margin of trade (the decision taken by
natives about selling abroad) and the share of migrants in total
population. Interestingly, the relationship is positive but not
linear (in fact it is a square root), and it only occurs beyond
certain cut-off: below a certain share of migrants there is no
connection between migration and trade.
It is worth underlining that statistical mechanics provides a
description of the system considered just in terms of average
behaviour. In an ideal experiment one can produce several
independent realizations of the same system and their average is
expected to converge to the theoretical prediction. As discussed
later, for the real system considered here we can reasonably take
each of the Spanish provinces as an independent realization and
then average the related outcomes. Such an average will be
compared with the theoretical outcomes from statistical
mechanics.
The model
We assume a population of N agents divided into two groups: N1
natives and N2 immigrants, being N1+N2=N and
g  N2
N
; ð1Þ
1 g  N1
N
; ð2Þ
G  gð1 gÞ; ð3Þ
where γ and 1− γ measure the relative size of each group,
respectively, while Γ represents the normalized number of cross
links between the two communities. For a small γ, Γ≈γ. Since the
share of migrants in a particular territory tends to be small (and
certainly it is the case of Spain), we will use Γ to capture γ.
Next, we introduce variables fsigN1i¼1 and fzmgN2m¼1, such that
σi∈ {− 1,+1} represents the propensity of the native agent i to
establish (σi=+1) or not establish (σi=− 1) a trade, while the
variables zmAℝ encode the information that the μ-th immigrant
can provide regarding trading toward her country of origin. The
sign of zμ indicates whether the information favors (zμ40) or not
(zμo0) the establishment of a trade, while its magnitude indicates
the strength of the signal. The ensemble fzmgN2m¼1 represents the
social capital of the immigrant community and, in the absence of
any additional information, in a mean-field approach, it can be
thought of as a collection of Gaussian variables identically and
independently distributed1
The decisional mechanism results from the interactions
between natives and migrants and it is described by a
Hamiltonian (that is, a cost function in the economics vocabulary)
denoted by hðs; z; J; nÞ. This function is dependent on the
native-native interactions and on the native-migrant interactions,
encoded by J and ξ, respectively (see Fig. 1, left panel), as well as
on the overall configurations of agents themselves (that is, {σ} for
natives and {z} for migrants). We now inspect in more detail the
interaction patterns and the resulting Hamiltonian.
The interaction between the ith native and the μth immigrant is
encoded by the variable ξiμ∈ {0, 1} describing the presence
(ξiμ= 1) or the absence (ξiμ= 0) of a connection (for example,
friend, work colleague, acquaintance, relative, workmate and
client) between i and μ. Since we lack detailed information about
individual connections and since migration flows are reasonably
uncorrelated (that is, the time-scales considered are long enough
and migrants come from a wide range of countries), the most
basic assumption one can pose is simply to consider the
completely general set of ξiμ as i.i.d. aleatory variables, extracted
with probability
ℙðxmi ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1 ℙðxmi ¼ 0Þ ¼
x
Ny
; ð4Þ
where θ∈ (0, 1), and xAℝþ are province-dependent parameters.
In this way, as developed further in the Appendix C of
Supplementary Information, by properly tuning θ and ξ, the
network recovers all the standard topological regimes (for
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example, extreme dilution, finite connectivity and so on) and,
accordingly, different degrees of interaction among the two
communities are captured.
For the set of variables, J, its entry Jij describes the connection
between natives i and j. We assume these couplings to be
arbitrary but endowed with a well defined, positive average value
J , that, in principle, depends on the province p.
In fact, the bulk of the migration-trade relation is known to be
an in-province phenomenon: exports from a province to a given
foreign country do not receive significant stimuli by immigrants
coming from that country but living in a different province
(Artal-Tur et al., 2012). Therefore, we can fix the resolution at the
provincial level and treat each province as a different sample over
which we will average. Accordingly, the system to be modelled
represents any province in Spain.
Therefore, at the provincial level of resolution, the system can
be described by the Hamiltonian
hðs; z; J; xÞ ¼  1
N1
XN1
ði;jÞ
J ijsisj  1
N1y
XN1
i¼1
XN2
m¼1
xmi sizm; ð5Þ
E J
N1
XN1
ði;jÞ
sisj  1
N1y
XN1
i¼1
XN2
m¼1
xmi sizm; ð6Þ
where the size-dependent factors in front of the sums ensure that
the cost function is well defined (that is, linearly extensive with
respect to the system size). It should be noted that, because of the
minus sign in front of each term in the Hamiltonian above, its
minimization tends to align the decisions of the agents. Thus,
hðs; z; J; xÞ constitutes the mathematical expression that
describes the imitative behaviour at the level of single agents
(Brock and Durlauf, 2001).
Before proceeding, we need to introduce a parameter β to tune
the degree of stochasticity in the system, in such a way that for
β→ 0 the system behaves completely randomly, while as β→∞
the system deterministically relaxes to the configuration corre-
sponding to the minimum of the cost function. Following the
statistical mechanics machinery, we associate with each config-
uration of the variables {σ, z} a probability of being observed
given by the so called Boltzmannfaktor weight Pβ(σ, z; J, ξ), that
reads as
Pbðs; z; J; xÞ ¼ exp½bhðs; z; J; xÞZðb; J; xÞ ; ð7Þ
where, the normalizing denominator Z(β, J, ξ) is called partition
function of the model and is defined as the sum over all the
possible 2N1 configurations {σ} and the Gaussian integral over all
the possible configurations {z} (hence ensuring Pβ(σ, z; J, ξ) to be
a probability), namely
Zðb; J; xÞ ¼
X
fsg
e
bJ
N1
PN1
i;j
sisj Z
dmðzÞe
b
N1y
PN1
i¼1
PN2
m¼1
xmi sizm ð8Þ
¼
X
fsg
e
bJ
N1
PN1
i;j
sisj
e
b2
N2ð1yÞ
PN1
ði;jÞ
PN2
m¼1
xmi x
m
j sisj
; ð9Þ
where we define dμ(z) the standard Gaussian measure.
Given the exponential form of the Boltzmannfaktor, as β
appears coupled to h in its exponent, one can see that
Pβ(σ, z; J, ξ) defined in equation (7) becomes flat (that is,
uniform) for β→ 0, thus each configuration has the same
probability to happen, regardless of its cost, while for β→∞
only the global minima of the Hamiltonian are selected, thus
players are expected to be perfectly rational.
Crucially, by a direct comparison of the arguments in
the exponents of equations (8) and (9), respectively, we also
learn that the bipartite interactions between natives and
immigrants (that is, those p
PN1
i¼1
PN2
m¼1 x
m
i sizm in equation
(8)) are stored in an effective coupling, referred to as ~Jij,
between couples of local decision makers alone (that is,
those p
PN1
ði;jÞ
PN2
m¼1 x
m
i x
m
j sisj in equation (9)). Such a coupling
(referred to as Hebbian-like; Agliari and Barra, 2011) reads as:
~J ij ¼
PN2
m¼1 x
m
i x
m
j
N2ð1yÞ1
: ð10Þ
Therefore, the bipartite model described in equation (5)
behaves equivalently to a monopartite model with cooperation
among natives only and embedded in a random, diluted structure
(see Fig. 1, right panel) (Agliari and Barra, 2011):
hðs; z; J; xÞ ¼  J
N1
XN1
ði;jÞ
sisj
 1
N1y
XN1
i¼1
XN2
m¼1
xmi sizm3h^ðs; J; xÞ
¼  1
N1
XN1
ði;jÞ
J þ ~Jij
 
sisj: ð11Þ
The system described by h^ðs; J; xÞ is embedded in a topology
ruled by the parameters J; y; x, and it is affected by a noise ruled
by β. By varying these parameters, this model is known to
undergo a phase transition, namely, to switch from a (noisy)
Figure 1 | Representation of the networks describing the mutual
interactions among the agents making up the system under study.
Left panel: Sketch of the bipartite network modelling mutual interactions
between natives (left community) and immigrants (right community).
Each node represents an agent, whose flag mirrors her country of origin
(for migrants we simply show the six most represented communities in
Spain). To simplify the representation of the network, we omit the links
representing interactions among Spanish agents. Right panel: Sketch of
the equivalent monopartite network built by Spanish decision makers
only; this exhibits the same properties (that is, the same first order
statistics on all its observables) with the original bipartite one. Basically,
in this monopartite network, two agents are connected if they share at
least one neighbour in the bipartite network. For instance, nodes labelled
as 1 and 2 share one neighbour (corresponding to μ=2), while nodes
labelled as 1 and 6 do not share any neighbour.
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behaviour, where its agents choose individually, to a deterministic
behaviour, where coordination among decision makers prevails
and collective phenomena (those resulting from their interac-
tions) become dominant. The onset of this global change
corresponds to a point in the parameter space called critical
point: in the present context, the latter can be related to the
existence of a critical mass of migrants necessary before their
interactions become relevant in affecting international trade
relationships.
To identify the existence of a critical point, we need to
introduce the concept of ‘order parameter’, namely a simple
function able to distinguish between a pure random behaviour
of the agents and a coordinated one: it is straightforward to
check that, for this model, the order parameter is given
by MðrÞ ¼ 1=N1
PN1
i¼1 siIsi;þ1, namely the fraction of agents
inclined to establish trade relationships abroad. This order
parameter is equivalent (upon translation) to mðrÞ ¼ 1=N1
PN1
i¼1 si,
namely the simpler arithmetic average over the state of all
the agents. Thus, in what follows, we focus on m as this is
mathematically easier to deal with.
By applying statistical mechanics procedures on h^ðs; J; xÞ, we
attain the following self-consistent equation for m (see Appendix B
of Supplementary Information for a detailed derivation)
m ¼ tanh½mðbJ þ b2x2GÞ: ð12Þ
This is our key finding: exploiting the proportionality between
the number of trading agents (total natives) m and the total
number of trading companies Y, namely m ∝ Y (see Appendix A
of Supplementary Information), it relates the number of trade
relationships to the share of migrants in the total population
(we recall Γ= γ(1− γ)≈γ). The agreement between equation (12)
and the empirical data concerning Spanish provinces is investi-
gated in the Data Analysis section.
Interestingly, equation (12) contains also information
regarding the critical percentage Γc of migrants that must be
reached before they can start to influence new trade relation-
ships. To extract such information, we exploit the statistical
mechanics know-how of phase transitions: when the factor
ðbJ þ b2x2GÞ in the argument of the hyperbolic tangent is
smaller than one, the only solution for equation (12) is m= 0
(that is, migrants do not boost trading). However, as the
factor gets larger than one, non-zero solutions appear and the
system, in the physical jargon, experiences a phase transition.
To find these solutions, we can expand the hyperbolic tangent
in small m as
mBbðJ þ bx2GÞm b
3
3
ðJ þ bx2GÞ3m3 þOðm3Þ; ð13Þ
and, excluding the unstable solution (m= 0), we get
mB
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
3
b3ðJ þ bx2GÞ3½bðJ þ bx
2GÞ  1
s
¼ a
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
G Gc
p
; ð14Þ
where we define
a ¼ 3x
2
bðJ þ bx2GcÞ3
; ð15Þ
Gc ¼ 1 bJðbxÞ2 : ð16Þ
From equation (14) we see that a positive m, corresponding to
a boost in the number of trade relationships, emerges as soon as
the fraction of migrants within a given province is larger than Γc.
Thus, the latter represents the threshold in the percentage of
migrants in the host territory over which export activity in the
host territory is actually stimulated by migrants. As can be seen in
equation (14), Γc decreases with J and with ξ, where, J is related to
the overall connection of the network of natives alone, and ξ
accounts for the connection between the two parties. This
suggests that a possible strategy to stimulate more trade
relationships at fixed Γ is to increase ξ, namely the number of
cross links between the communities of natives and migrants.
Before concluding it is worth summarizing some fundamental
features about the migration-trade link, derived from our
statistical mechanics investigation. First of all, the relation
between Γ and Y is non-linear, as these observables are related
via an hyperbolic tangent (see equation (12)); this can be
approximated by a simpler square root relation for small migrants
percentages (see equation (14)). Second, there is a critical value
for the fraction of migrants, depending on the degree of
connection among the two communities, beyond which migrants
start to have a positive impact on the number of trade
relationships of the host territory. As soon as the level of
migrants exceeds the critical one, the growth in the number of
trade relationships is expected to be very steep since the functionffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
G Gc
p
has an infinite derivative in Γc.2 Finally, there is a
saturation effect for large enough Γ as the hyperbolic tangent is a
bounded function that eventually reaches a plateau. This is in
agreement with exhaustion levels in bilateral exports that have
already been linked with migrant saturation effects as, for
instance, in the experimental works discussed in (Egger et al.,
2012).
Results
In this section we test our theoretical outcomes using Spanish
data on migration and bilateral exports over the period 2000–
2012. The empirical analysis is split into three sub-sections.
First, we assess whether there is a square-root relationship
between the total number of trade relationships abroad and the
share of migrants in the population, treating the whole set
of immigrants as a unique community. Second, we repeat the
analysis at a more disaggregated level, distinguishing several sets
of immigrants according to their country of origin. Third,
we investigate the scaling between product diversification and
migrant density.
Data analysis on aggregate exports and migrants
The first dataset is obtained by merging two publicly available
sources: trade data come from ADUANAS-AEAT dataset
provided by Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda (www
.datacomext.comercio.es), and demographic data come from the
Spanish Statistical Office (www.ine.es). The unit of reference is
the province (Eurostat NUTS III). The trade data comprise the
aggregate value of exports and the number of exporting firms.
The number of foreign-born population is used to measure
immigration stocks. The period of analysis is 1998–2012, with
annual frequency.
We consider the time series for the extensive margin of exports
{Yt,p} and for the share of immigrants {γt,p}, along the range of
years t= 1998,…, 2012 and for the 50 provinces p= 1,…50
making up the whole country except for two province-cities in
Africa, Ceuta and Melilla. Thus, our time range is made of Nt= 15
years and our geographic set is made of Np= 50 provinces.
Since we are using historical data, our first task is to check that
at least one of the observables Y and γ is monotonically increasing
with respect to the years t. Figure 2 shows that γ(t) satisfies this
request. Thus, we are allowed to invert γ(t)→ t(γ) and look at the
evolution of Y as a function of γ, so to obtain Y(γ), that must then
be suitably binned and averaged (see (Barra and et al., 2014a) for
details on this procedure).
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This operation is performed for each of the Np Spanish
provinces. We consider different provinces as independent
realizations (or, otherwise stated, extractions) of the same
system. This means that the number of trade relationships of a
given province depends only on the fraction of immigrants
within the province itself. While there is general consensus on
this (Herander and Saavedra, 2005; Bahar et al., 2014), the
empirical consistency of such hypothesis for the Spanish
test case is shown in Artal-Tur et al. (2012), where the
authors prove that the proximity (meant as geographical
closeness) is key for the diffusion of the social capital and
therefore for the expansion in the number of trade relation-
ships abroad.
Therefore, for each province p, we can measure the percentage
of immigrants γp and plot the related amount of trade relation-
ships Yp versus Γp≈γp; examples for the three largest provinces are
shown in Fig. 3 (left panel). In general, the theoretical predictions
(see equation (12)) are in remarkable agreement with the
empirical behaviour.3 It is worth noting that, in the best fitting
procedure, an extra parameter, referred as a, has to be introduced.
This is because statistical mechanics usually works with
normalized order parameters (that is, m≤ 1), but in order to
account for the proper range of variability of Y (that is not
bounded in principle), a linear scaling must be applied, that is
Y= am. We notice that this linear proportionality is perfectly
consistent with the model assumptions experimentally verified in
Appendix A of Supplementary Information.
We performed extensive fits over all the provinces available
according to equation (12), which we report hereafter as
Y ¼ atanh½ ð1 bÞG
Gc
þ b
 
Y
a
; ð17Þ
where we highlighted the critical density Γc= (1 − b)/(βξ)2 and we
posed b ¼ bJ . Also, as mentioned above, the coefficient a
accounts for the intrinsic non-normalized nature of Y, in contrast
with m. The best-fit coefficients are collected in Fig. 3 (right
panels).
In particular, we notice that log(a) is roughly uniformly
distributed along the range (12,19), suggesting that the extent of
exports varies over several orders of magnitude, according to the
province considered. On the other hand, Γc looks Poissonian-like
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
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10−4
10−3
10−2
10−4
10−3
10−2
Figure 2 | The fraction of migrants in each Spanish province grows
monotonically with time.
Note: We collect the historical series for the fraction of migrants γ in
each Spanish province over the period 1998–2012 and we consider
Γ≡γ(1− γ) representing the fraction of potential native-immigrant pairs.
For small γ (and this is the case for Spain in the time window
considered), γ≈Γ. In this figure we show Γ versus time t for the three
largest provinces (from top to bottom: Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia) and
for various countries of origin (depicted in different colours as shown by
the legend). Notice that, Γ grows monotonically with t, and this is found
also for the rest of Spanish provinces. Through the monotonicity of
Γ(t) we can invert the function to obtain t(Γ). The latter can then be
plugged into the dynamics of trade Y(t) to obtain the evolution Y(Γ),
as reported in Figs. 3 and 4.
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Figure 3 | Fit of experimental data on the total number of exporting firms with our theoretical law and analysis of the fitting coefficients.
Left panel: Extent of trade relationships Y versus fraction of immigrants Γ for three different provinces as explained by the legend; we choose the
three largest provinces for the sake of readability and for consistency with the analysis of the following sections. However, we checked that analogous
plots hold also for the other provinces. In this plot empirical data (symbols) are compared with the theoretical prediction (solid line). More precisely,
each data point corresponds to a different year and the solid lines represent the best fit according to equation (17) and the goodness of the fit is
R2=0.94 (Madrid), R2=0.97 (Barcelona), and R2=0.95 (Valencia). By repeating the same procedure for all the Np provinces, we derive for each
province p the best-fit coefficients Γc, a, and b. The histograms for these coefficients are shown in the right panels. In particular, Γc, is Poissonian
distributed with peak around 0.003 (upper panel), a spans over several orders of magnitude (due to the broad range along which Yp spans)—and this
is why we actually represent the histogram of log(a) (middle panel), the coefficient b is peaked in agreement with the fact that J is a property of the
country as a whole and it is quite homogeneous from province to province.
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distributed and is peaked around 0.003, suggesting that when the
total amount of immigrants is less than 0.3% of the whole
population inside the province, their presence is ineffective as
facilitator of trade with their country of origin.
Data analysis on bilateral trade relationships (firms) and
migrants
In order to get a clearer picture, and to evaluate more precisely
the country-dependent critical threshold Γc, we consider
migrants by nationality and exporting firms from the host
province to the country of origin of migrants. As such, we
analyse the bilateral trade relationships Yp,f performed between
any province p and any foreign country f as a function of the
related fraction of immigrants Γp,f. Of course, results are
expected to be much noisier, as we are dealing with
considerable smaller datasets and the intrinsic fluctuations
are only partially smoothened by the central limit theorem.
Nonetheless, it is worth checking whether the previous results
are still valid at this finer level of resolution and inferring the
country-dependent critical masses. We focus on the three
major Spanish cities, namely Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia
(Fig. 4), and on the foreign countries for which the size of
immigrant communities are larger and span a wide interval in
the time window considered, in order to get more accurate
and reliable fits according to equation (17). In general, the
agreement between empirical data and theoretical expectations
is very good (the coefficient of determination R2 is close to 1),
further corroborating the picture provided by our model.
Moreover, the fitting procedure allows an estimate for Γc for
each pair (p,f) to be obtained. These values are shown in Fig. 5
restricting to the most solid estimates. Remarkably, for bilateral
trades Γc follows a distribution peaked around GcE105, that is
consistent with the previous value B3?103 found for global
trades as migrants come from O(102) different countries.
Data analysis on export product diversification
Having shown that the amount of trade relationships is positively
influenced by migration, in this section we aim to investigate
whether the diversification of exports is enhanced by migration too.
In order to keep the analysis as smooth as possible, we follow
the simplest possible route (leaving possible improvements based
on, for instance, complexity measures (Tacchella, 2002; Caldarelli
and et al., 2012; Cristelli and et al., 2013) as options for future
additional work): the export portfolio of a province is composed
of products and destinations. That is, a province can export
several products to a single destination or export the same
product to several destinations. Thus, the basic unit in the export
portfolio is a product–destination pair. We define K as the total
number of product–destination pairs in the export portfolio of a
province. Products are defined using the Combined Harmonised
System (HS) provided by UN COMTRADE database (we exclude
special product categories, HS98 and HS99). Destinations are
defined as countries with more than 1 million population in 2010.
There are 4507 products and 154 countries, so the total number
of product–destination K pairs is 694078.
To account for the distribution of export sales across product–
destination pairs, we use the export share of each product–
destination pair in total export value so to capture the relative
importance of each pair for exports. The Herfindahl index NH
(Beck and et al., 2001) is a simple calculation of concentration of
exports that uses such export shares: the larger the number NH,
the more concentrated (less diversified) the export portfolio of the
province is. Therefore, if migrants do really contribute to
diversification of exports, we should evidence a negative
correlation between NH and Γ.
More precisely, the NH index is calculated as
NH ¼
XK
i¼1
xi
X
 2
; ð18Þ
Figure 4 | Fit of experimental data on bilateral trade relationships with our theoretical law.
Note: We select the three largest provinces out of the available Np and for each of them we consider the data for trade relationships Yp,f performed
between the province p and the foreign country f. The data for trade relationships Yp,f are then analysed versus the fraction of migrants Γp,f residing in
p and hailing from f and we perform the best fits according to the theoretical law in equation (17). Here we show the comparison between the
empirical data (symbols) and best fits (solid lines) for Madrid (left panels), Barcelona (middle panels), Valencia (left panels). Different countries are
depicted in different colours and symbols as specified by the legend. The foreign countries considered are those where Γ spans over the largest
interval in such a way that fits can be more accurate.
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where xi is the value of export in product–destination i and X is
the total value of exports. One can further normalize NH to get an
index nH whose values lie between 0 and 1. Results are shown in
Fig. 6, where the negative correlation between nH and the
percentage of migrants Γ within the province is evidenced. More
precisely, the two observables scale as nHBG1=d, with dB5 (see
the caption of Fig. 6 for further details).
Thus, at least for small percentages of migrants, that is Γ≈γ,
there is a positive correlation between export portfolio diversi-
fication and the density of migrants in a particular province. We
can therefore conclude that migrants, in this context, also
contribute to diversify the export product portfolio of the host
province.
Conclusions and outlooks
Tools from theoretical physics have recently been applied to
economics to identify possible mechanisms and relations
underlying empirical evidence. For instance, a remarkable result
recently obtained is that the composition of exports from the
most developed countries tends to be highly diversified rather
than concentrated in a few products (Tacchella, 2002; Hidalgo
et al., 2007; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). Here, with an
analogous intent, we adopt a statistical-mechanics approach and
we investigate whether the presence of large number of migrants
in a developed country (Spain) contributes to explain the growth
in the number of exporting firms and, by extension, to diversify
the product portfolio of exports. Our framework, based on
statistical mechanics, allows us to explain how an increasing
number of interactions between natives and migrants is
positively related to the number of trade relationships between
the host country and the country of origin of the migrants.
From an economic perspective, our theoretical results suggest
that the scaling between the extensive margins of trade (that is,
the number of exporting firms) versus the percentage of migrants
living in the host country is non-linear. In particular, for small
percentages of migrants in the host country the relation can be
well approximated well by a square root, while for larger
percentages saturation effects are expected and a plateau can
eventually be reached with the scaling of an hyperbolic tangent.
Furthermore, we examine the possible relationship between the
share of migrants in the total population and the extent of
diversification of the portfolio of exported goods. We find
evidence of a strong positive correlation.
Unlike previous research (Gould, 1994; Egger et al., 2012;
Serrano-Domingo and Requena-Silvente, 2013), we highlight the
existence of a minimum threshold of migrants such that, when
the percentage of migrants in the host territory is relatively small,
migrants do not have any impact on trade. We also find that the
threshold is sensitive to the nationality of the migrants, suggesting
that cultural differences between natives and migrants may affect
the number of migrants needed to generate a positive impact
on trade.
Remarkably, the model underlying these findings allows us to
relate the importance of the minimum threshold to social features
such as the degree of interaction between immigrants and natives.
By increasing the number of interactions, the threshold is lowered
with a consequent improvements in the number of trade
relationships.
Our work also suggests that what matters is the share of
migrants as percentage of the native population rather than the
total number of migrants. Moreover, our approach can be used
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Figure 5 | Estimates for the critical density of immigrants obtained by
fitting data on number of exporting firms: their distribution and their
average values suggest robust behaviours among provinces.
Note: We select the four largest provinces (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia
and Sevilla) out of the available Np and for each of them we consider the
data for trades Yp,f performed between the province p and the foreign
country f. The data for trade relationships Yp,f are then analysed versus
the fraction of migrants Γp,f residing in p and hailing from f and we
perform the best fits according to the theoretical law in equation (17).
In this way we obtain estimates for the critical density of immigrants
Γc and the related R2, which are plotted in the upper panel. Different
symbols and colours refer to different provinces as explained by the
legend. Each data point represents a different pair (p,f). The most
reliable fits (that is, R2 close to 1) suggest that Γc is distributed around
10− 5, and this holds for all the four provinces analysed. Focusing on
estimates corresponding to R240.85, we build the histogram of
Γc (shown in the middle panel) and calculate its arithmetic average to get
Gc, which is plotted in the lower panel as a function of the population of
the related province.
Figure 6 | The Herfindahl index decreases monotonically with the
fraction of migrants.
Note: In the main plot bullets represent the value of the normalized
diversification index nh for different province and different years as a
function of the fraction of migrants Γ present in the same province in the
same year. Green squares represent binned data and the solid red line is
the related best fit (R2≈0.93). This is a linear curve (in log-log scale)
y= p1x+p2, with p1=−0.21±0.01 and p2=−5.47±0.01. The fitting has
also been performed for data of nh pertaining to any single province and
any single year, hence obtaining p1(y,p). These values have been
averaged over the provinces to get p1 ðyÞ ¼
PNp
p¼1 p1ðy; pÞ=Np which is
shown in the inset (the line is a guide for the eye). This plot shows that
the monotonicity of nh with respect to Γ (that is,p1o0) is robust with
respect to the year; the same holds even when we average over the year,
namely it is robust with respect to the province.
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to examine other related issues such as the impact of formal or
informal firm networks on trade.
To conclude, we derive a simple model based on agents
cooperation that allows us to gain insights into the role of
international migration in the evolution and diversification of
international trade relationships. We can identify a number
of improvements and refinements for future related works.
One aspect worthy of consideration is migrants’ heterogeneity:
even in a community of people from the same country, the
social and cultural composition can be very different, from
refugees, economic workers and unskilled workers to profes-
sionals and entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the adoption of more
complex measures of products’ diversification to better
address the outlined (indirect) influence of migrants on the
global market would be advantageous. Finally, turning to the
experimental protocol, other hosting countries should be
considered beyond Spain to give more ground to the theory as
a whole.
Notes
1 This assumption is only the simplest working assumption but the scenario we outline
in this work is robust under several other choices, that is, zμ∈ {+1, − 1} as shown in
Barra et al. (2011); Barra and et al. (2014b).
2 ΓoΓc is technically possible. However, in that case, the cooperative couplings among
agents are ineffective and the solution of the statistical mechanics model is no longer
the square-root but a constant. This means that, in this regime, a change in the fraction
of migrants is not expected to affect the amount of new trade relationships. In other
words, Γc is a singular point for the solution Y(Γ) and the square-root is solution only
beyond Γc.
3 Note that the error implied by replacing γ with Γ, estimated to be O(1%), is smaller
than intrinsic fluctuations.
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